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when they are awarded, they most
often serve as a statutorily-imposed
punitive measure, the need to include them in compensatory damages diminishes. Under this view,
attorney's fees would seem to be an
appropriate consideration in measuring an award of punitive damages.
[d at 350-51,568 A2d at 4l.
The court was equally unimpressed by
the argument that jury discretion would
be affected. To the contrary, the court
saw it as an opportunity to provide
needed guidance to the jury. Citing
Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco
Disposa4 Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989), it
pointed to the Supreme Court's concern
over the lack of direction provided to
juries in measuring the amount of punitive damages. st. Luke Church, 318 Md.
at 351-52, 568A.2d at 42. The amount of
a prevailing party's legal fees would furnish a degree of guidance to the jury not
previously provided. [d.
The court looked at the approaches
taken by certain states which allow consideration of attorney'S fees in the award
of punitive damages. It rejected the Connecticut approach which limits the
award of punitive damages to the amount
of attorney's fees incurred by the prevailingparty.Id at 352-53, 568A2dat42-43.
Rather, the court agreed with the Kansas
approach where the amount of
attorney's fees is merely one objective
factor for the jury to consider. Id
Thus, the court of appeals reversed the
court of special appeals and reinstated
the jury's punitive damage award. The
decision satisfied two of the court's
goals. By presenting the jury with evidence of a prevailing claimant's
attorney's fees, the jury is provided with
helpful guidance in measuring an award
of punitive damages as well as a meaningful way to punish the wrongdoer for
flagrant misconduct.
-John A. Nolet

price-fIXing agreement was held to be a
per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act and section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act.
Pursuant to the District of Columbia's
Criminal Justice Act (ClA) , lawyers in
private practice were appointed and
compensated to represent indigent defendants in various criminal cases. With
the majority of appointments going to a
group of about 100 lawyers referred to as
"CJA regulars. " These cases represented
approximately 85% of the total caseload
in the District. "After 1970, the Criminal
Justice Act set fees at $30 per hour for
court time and $20 per hour for out-ofcourt time, and despite a 147 percent
increase in the consumer price index,
compensation remained at those levels
until the boycott" occurred. Id. at 786
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
In 1982, the respondents, Superior
Court Trial
Lawyers Association
(SCTIA) , unsuccessfully attempted to
persuade the District to raise rates. As a
result, in 1983, the SCTIA members met
and agreed not to accept any new cases
after September 6, 1983, unless legislation was passed providing for an increase
in rates. When the legislation was not
passed, 90% of the SCTIA members refused to accept new assignments.
The boycott had a severe impact on
the District's criminal justice system.
Within days, the District's government
offered the SCTIA a temporary increase
to $35 per hour with a permanent increase to $45 per hour for out-of-court
time and $55 per hour for court time. The
SCTIA accepted the offer and ended the
boycott.
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC),
however, filed a complaint against the
SCTIA alleging that the agreement was a
restraint of trade and characterized the
SCTIA's conduct as a conspiracy to fIX
prices. The complaint was heard before
an administrative law judge (AL]) who
recognized the violation of the antitrust
laws, but dismissed the complaint because the increased fees would have a
beneficial effect. The increased fees
would attract new CJA lawyers and allow
the current CJA lawyers to reduce their
caseload in order to provide better representation.Id. at 773.
The FTC disagreed, asserting that as a
result of the boycott, the city would
spend an additional 4 to 5 million dollars
a year for the same legal services. [d.
Accordingly, the FTC filed a cease-anddesist order to prevent the SCTIA from
initiating a similar boycott in the future.

protection. Therefore, a restriction on
this form of expression could not be
justified unless the restriction was no
greater than what was necessary to protect an important governmental right. Id.
at 774 (citing United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367 (1968». The court concluded that the O'Brien test could not be
satisfied by the application of an otherwise appropriate per se rule of antitrust
law, but instead required the enforcement agency to prove, rather than presume, that the Sherman Act was violated.
[d. (citing Superior Court Trial Lawyers
Ass'n v. F. T. C, 856 F.2d 226,248-50 (D.c.
Cir. 1988». The court of appeals, therefore, vacated the cease-and-desist order
and remanded the case for a determination of whether the SCTIA actually possessed "Significant market power,"
which would justify the restriction of
their first amendment rights.
The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the SCTIA's boycott was per
se violative of section 1 of the Sherman
Act and section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act. F.T.C, 110S.Ct.at774.
As the FTC, the ALJ, and-the court of
appeals all agreed, the SCTIA's boycott
constituted a classic restraint of trade
within the meaning of section 1 of the
Sherman Act. Id. The Court rejected the
boycott's social justifications, as well the
SCTIA's objective in bringing about favorable legislation. Id. at 776. In addition,
the Court reasoned that because the
SCTIA's objective was to gain an economic advantage for those participating
in the boycott, the conduct was not protected by the first amendment. Id. at 778.
The Court pointed out that constitutional
protection does not apply "to a boycott
conducted by business competitors who
stand to profit financially from a lessening of competition in the boycotted market." Id. at 777 (quoting Allied Tube &
Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486
u.s. 492, 508 (1988».
The Court then considered whether
the court of appeals was correct in creating a new exception to the per se rules
of antitrust liability. The court of appeals
relied on United States v. O'Brien, 391
u.s. 367 (1968). O'Brien violated a federal statute when he burned his Selective
Service registration certificate on the
steps of a Boston courthouse. In affirming his conviction, the Court concluded
that the statute's inCidental restriction on
O'Brien's freedom of expression was no
greater than necessary to further the
government's interest in requiring registrants to have valid certificates continually available. F.T.G., 110 S. Ct. at 778. In
light of O'Brien, the court of appeals held
that the expressive component of the
SCTIA's boycott compelled the "courts

F.T.C v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n: A BOYC01T BY A GROUP
OF lAWYERS CONSTI1UfED AN
AGREEMENf TO FIX PRICES IN
VIOlATION OF TIlE ANTITRUST
STA1UfES
In F. T. C v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association, 110 S. Ct. 768 (1990),
the Supreme Court held that an agreement among a group of trial lawyers to
refuse representation of indigent criminal defendants until the government increased their compensation amounted to
price-fIXing. The Court reasoned that the
[d.
expressive component of such a boycott
The court of appeals found that the
was not protected by the fmt amendment and did not create an exception to
SCTIA boycott contained elements of
expression warranting first amendment
the antitrust statutes. As a result, the
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At her criminal trial, Gerst alleged that
to apply the antitrust laws 'prudently and
exception to the per se rules of antitrust
she withdrew the cash at the request of
with sensitivity,' with a 'special soliciliability. Id.
tude for the First Amendment rights' of
Samuel Hill, a partner in the firm, and
The impact of this decision is substan[the SCfLA)." Id. (quoting Superior
then turned the money over to him. This
tial. Previously, the notion of a boycott
Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n. v. F. T. C, 856
conflicted with Hill's testimony that
had been an agreement among the parF.2d at 233-34). Thus, the court of apwithdrawals from the account were alticipants to refrain from engaging in cerpeals shifted the burden to the FfC to
lowed by internal paper transfer only,
tain activities in order to bring about a
show that the boycotters possessed sufand denied ever authorizing cash withchange. It was thought that this type of
ficient market power to warrant a per se
drawals or receiving any cash from Gerst.
agreement was protected by the first
violation of the antitrust laws.
After a three-day jury trial, Gerst was
amendment because it was a form of
The Supreme Court, however, found
acquitted.
expression. Now, if such an agreement
the court of appeals' analysis to have
Thereafter, Gerst retained Howard J.
has the objective of bringing about an
been critically flawed in two respects.
Needle and Sarah C. King for an initial
economic benefit to the participants, the
First, the court of appeals exaggerated
counsel fee, with additional fees on a
courts must characterize the agreement
the significance of the expressive comcontingency fee basis. A suit was subseas a restraint of trade. The courts are then
ponent in the SCfLA's boycott. The
quently initiated against White, Mindel,
required to apply the per se rules of
Court found nothing unique about the
Clarke and Hill, as well as Hill and Foley
antitrust liability to the agreement and
expressive component of the SCfLA boypersonally, for, Ultimately, malicious
find it violative of both the Sherman Act
cott. Rather, a rule that would require the
prosecution and intentional infliction of
and the Federal Trade Commission Act.
courts to apply the antitrust laws with
emotional distress. At the extensive hear-Thomas J S. Waxter, III
prudence and sensitivity whenever a
ing on the defendant'S pre-trial motion
Needle v. White, Minde~ Clark & HiU:
boycott had an expressive component
for summary judgment, Gerst asserted
TRIAL COURT'S DEOSION TO
"would create a gaping hole in the fabric
that the initiation of criminal charges by
SANCITON REVERSED AS CLEARLY
of those laws." Id. at 780.
the firm was motivated solely by the
ERRONEOUS
Second, the Court found that the court
firm's efforts to collect on its employee
In Needle v. White, Minde4 Clarke &
of appeals was incorrect in their assessfidelity insurance policy, and resulted in
Hill, 81 Md. App. 463, 568 A.2d 856
ment of the antitrust laws. Id. at 779. The
her emotional distress. Conversely, the
(1990), the Court of Special Appeals of
Court criticized the court of appeals' asdefendants argued that Gerst instituted
Maryland held that the trial court's decisumption that the per se rule against
her civil action as retaliation for the crimto impose over $143,000 in sancsion
price-fIXing and boycotts "is only a rule
inal charges filed against her. The motion
tions, pursuant to Maryland Rule 1-341,
of 'administrative convenience and effiwas denied.
was
clearly erroneous. After reviewing all
ciency,' and not a statutory command."
The case proceeded to trial where the
the evidence in the underlying suit, the
Id. at 780. While the Court conceded that
issues were whether the law firm insticourt held that neither of the plaintiff's
the per se rules of liability were in part
tuted a criminal proceeding against Gerst
attorneys, nor their client, lacked the
justified by administrative convenience,
without probable cause for a purpose
substantial justification required to bring
the per se rules "reflect a long-standing
other than bringing an offender to jussuit, nor had they brought the suit in bad
judgment that the prohibited practices
tice, and whether, as a result, Gerst suffaith. An attorney need only bring forth a
by their nature have a 'substantial potenfered emotional distress. Needle, 81 Md.
colorable claim to avoid the imposition
tial for impact on competition.'" Id.
App. 467, 568 A.2d at 858. Conflicting
of sanctions, while a court cannot use the
(quotingjefferson Parish Hospital Distestimony was heard on the procedure of
benefit of hindsight to determine the
trictNo.2v.Hyde, 466 U.S. 2,16(1984)).
cash withdrawals and the ultimate desticlaim's merits.
As Justice Douglas stated in a footnote to
nation of the funds in question. DefenAfter a thirteen-year term of employUnited States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
dants renewed their motion for summary
ment, Carolyn Gerst was amicably termi310 U.S. 150 (1940), "whatever ecojudgment at the close of Gerst's case and
nated from her position as a bookkeeper
nomic justifications particular price-fixagain at the conclusion of all the evifor the law firm of White , Mindel, Clarke
ing agreements may be thought to have,
dence. The trial court denied the former
and Hill. According to the firm, Gerst was
the law does not permit an inquiry into
and reserved ruling on the latter.
discharged simply because a replacetheir reasonableness. They are all banned
The issues, including whether Gerst
ment could do a better job. Yet her embecause of their actual or potential threat
stole money from the defendants, were
ployers subsequently discovered, among
to the central nervous system of the econsubmitted to the jury. The jury decided
other discrepancies, that approximately
omy." F. T. C 110 S. Ct. at 781-82 (quoting
that the defendants had a reasonable be$203,000 had been withdrawn from one
Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 225-26.
lief that Gerst took the money and that
of the firm's accounts, coinciding with
The Court also conceded that some
they did not report the matter to the
Gerst's fmal year of employment. Thus,
boycotts and some price-fIXing agreepolice with ill will or with a reckless
the firm instructed John Foley, a member
ments were more injurious to competidisregard for the truth. Additionally, the
of the firm, to file a claim for reimbursetion than others, but held that the court
jury found that Gerst suffered emotional
ment with the insurance company with
of appeals' assumption that absent proof
distress due to the filing of the police
whom they maintained a $100,000 emof market power the SCfLA boycott was
report, but that it was not severe, and that
ployee fidelity policy. The claim asserted
harmless, was inconsistent with the
Gerst did not steal the money. Id. at 468,
that the loss resulted from dishonest or
course of the Supreme Court's antitrust
568 A.2d at 858. Thus, a judgment was
fraudulent acts by Gerst. Additionally, a
jurisprudence.Id. at782. Here, there was
entered for the defendants.
complaint against Gerst was filed with
sufficient testimony to demonstrate that
Immediately following the verdict, the
the police, satisfying a condition of recovthe boycott produced a crisis in the
court, sua sponte, scheduled a sanctions
ery under the policy. The full $100,000
District's criminal justice system which
hearing on the issue of Maryland Rule
was eventually remitted to the firm,
achieved the SCfLA's economic goal.
1-341, Bad Faith - Unjustified Proceedwhile Gerst was charged with embezzleThus, the Supreme Court reversed the
ings. Id. Although having only allowed
ment.
court of appeals' decision creating an
three business days in between, the court
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